USSR in the post-war years: the struggle for economic independence (1945 - 1953)

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Abstract. Being the basis of the "Stalinist" economic policy, both due to the peculiarities of ideology and in the perspective of solving geopolitical problems, the struggle for the country's economic independence formed the post-war trajectory of the USSR. The purpose of the paper was to identify the influence of this factor on decisions taken by the Soviet leadership, both in domestic and in foreign policy. Archival materials that have become available to researchers make it possible to clarify the "Stalinist" strategy for solving the task of restoring the national economy and keeping countries of "people's democracy" in the zone of influence in the conditions of the formation of a bipolar world with an acute shortage of resources. The authors of the paper rely on a source database stored in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), in the funds of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in the funds of V.M. Molotov and of A.I. Mikoyan. Continued work with documents in this area promises to open the curtain on the "white spots" of late Stalinism, which remain the subject of heated discussions in historiography. Moreover, it is the post-war period that allows analyzing the "Stalinist" managerial model in its most complete form. Thus, it is also important to investigate its mechanisms from the point of view of solving the problem of the effectiveness / non-effectiveness of the Soviet system.

1 Introduction

The end of World War II formed a new geopolitical configuration. Naturally, the desire of the Soviet leadership to use the results of the Victory to defend the interests of the country (as they understood them). At the same time, being an authoritative player in the international arena, the USSR suffered enormous losses and needed to restore the national economy as soon as possible. It should be borne in mind that as soon as the last volleys died out on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, it became obvious - a weapon (of enormous destructive power) appeared that gave noticeable preferences to the country that managed to create it. It was this tangle of interacting factors that set the vector for the

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development of the USSR in the postwar years. And one of the key tasks of this period was the struggle for the economic independence of the country.

It would seem that the restoration of the country's economy as soon as possible while the successful implementation of the "nuclear project" was well studied and described. Nevertheless, the period of "late Stalinism" still causes fierce debates and has many white spots.

In modern historiography, a prominent role is played by the foreshortening of studies that place totalitarianism at the forefront, considering it the basis of this historical segment. The arguments of the supporters of this point of view are very clearly demonstrated by the professor of Russian history at the University of East London Donald Filzer in the monograph "Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism". He writes, summing up his researches: "... The reconstruction of Soviet industry meant, among other things, the restoration of the entire Stalinist economic system, including a strictly hierarchical structure of decision-making and the distribution of power. Without this, the perpetuation of the Stalinist political system would be unthinkable. The essence of the Stalinist industrialization of the 1930s. consisted in the fact that the source of the power of the elite and its privileges, the driving force of the entire economy was heavy industry. It is understandable, therefore, that the post-war reconstruction of just heavy industry should have been carried out at an accelerated pace and at any cost. Such an approach would be inevitable even if the Soviet leadership did not seek to strengthen the military power of the USSR in conditions of aggravation of the international situation. Having made the appropriate decision, the elite had to find ways to ensure maximum rates of accumulation and forcefully reduce the level of consumption, while the population dreamed of improving the quality of life..." [1].

Arch Getty, a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, "throws" the bridge from "Stalinism" to the practices of pre-revolutionary Russia, making the "undying tradition" of authoritarianism a feature of the Russian historical process [2].

At the same time, Robert S. Allen, professor of economic history at Oxford University, concludes that Soviet modernization, with its own characteristics, has been shown to be effective. Despite the fact that during the Second World War, GDP and population decreased by one fifth [3], by the mid-1950s. the improvements in personal consumption were so significant that "... a significant part of the population achieved a standard of living that was higher than that available to the working class and peasants in many less developed countries ..." [4]. The content of "Soviet-style modernization" has much more effective mechanisms and is not limited to tough (and sometimes cruel) management decisions. That is why the question "should we unconditionally accept a negative assessment of the situation in the USSR, or are certain aspects of the economic organization of that time worth taking into service in the future?" [4, 13] remains relevant today.

Meanwhile, the discussions are still far from completion, as the findings of the researchers are diametrically opposed. If Robert S. Allen, in the conclusion of his monograph, writes: the collapse of the Soviet economy is due to the fact that the new leaders did not find the right strategic solutions [4, 279], then the equally authoritative American economic historian Paul Gregory claims that it is the economic model itself that arose during the "great turning point" and whose dawn fell on the post-war decade, had "vicious" features that made its failure logical [5].

2 Materials and Methods

It should be noted the role of the "archival revolution", which opened access to a wide source base. This changed the situation described by the Italian researcher R. Toscano: "... the best place to write books on Soviet history was Stanford and Princeton, and not Moscow and Leningrad" [6, 10]. It is an appeal to the source database that allows us to

identify important details that clarify the ratio of subjective and objective factors in the adoption of certain decisions by Soviet leaders.

A research search brought the authors of the paper to the materials of the International Economic Conference (IES), held in Moscow from 3rd to 12th of April, 1952, stored in F. 82 (V.M. Molotov), F. 84 (A.I. Mikoyan) and F. 17 (Central Committee of the CPSU) of the Russian Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). An analysis of these documents adds “colors” to the “palette” of the problem of forming a strategy for the post-war development of the USSR and the choice of priorities by the Soviet leadership.

Doctor of Economics V.Yu. Katasonov puts forward a bold hypothesis about the plans of I.V. Stalin "on the formation of an alternative global financial and economic order" [7]. He writes: "... There are indications that some countries of the “third world” asked to join CMEA, but Stalin gently rejected these requests. Apparently, he conceived a wider range of countries, something like a customs union, which really could involve all the countries that resisted the Anglo-Saxon dictatorship. And the USSR could become an informal leader of the countries included in this wide circle” [7]. The Moscow International Economic Conference of 1952, according to Valentin Yurievich, was an important link in the implementation of this goal.

Doctor of Historical Sciences M.A. Lipkin regards the IES as the “first swallow” in the USSR’s transition to a policy of peaceful coexistence, traditionally associated with the Khrushchev period. He writes: “For the USSR, this was the first post-war attempt to open the Iron Curtain and prevent the deepening, first of all, of the military-political integration of the countries of Western Europe, proclaiming trade a means of peaceful coexistence” [8].

Thus, analyzing documents, researchers focus on various facets of the country's post-war development strategy. Nevertheless, it seems important to consider the problem raised from the point of view of the struggle for the economic independence of the USSR.

The authors of the study were guided by the principle of consistency - this made it possible to trace both the formation of a request for achieving the country's economic independence and its evolution when implemented in real business practice.

The basic principle of the study is the problem-chronological method, which was used for a consistent analysis of the managerial response of the Soviet leadership to emerging problems in chronological sequence.

The historical-critical method allowed an objective analysis of the source base of the study.

In the study, the authors relied on the theory of catch-up modernization, considering the development of the USSR as part of the response to the challenge of the global modernization process.

3 Results

The results of the study can be graphically depicted in the form of a diagram: (see Figure):

Fig. 1. The influence of the request on achieving economic independence of the country on the formation of the post-war development strategy.

As well as the table (see. Table):

Table 1. Tactics of the response of the Soviet leadership to the challenges of domestic and foreign policy in the implementation of his chosen strategy.

Task	Answer
Request for self-sufficiency of economy	Priority of development of sector “A” (production of capital goods)
Decrease in labor discipline, drop in labor productivity	Economic calculation, bonus system, director’s fund, production cost indicator for certain types of products
Money circulation disorder, “excess” money without commodity coverage	Monetary reform of 1947, increased fiscal burden on the population
Improving the standard of living of the country's population	Price reduction
Economic pressure on the USSR	Formation of CMEA, “project” of an alternative market, transfer of ruble to gold content

The priority of the factor of economic independence was a consequence of the understanding of I.V. Stalin and his supporters of the features of the construction of socialism in a single country. The rejection of the new economic policy and the choice of forced industrialization was to a large extent outlined by the need "... to protect our country from economic subordination to the world capitalism system" [9]. In 1941, at a meeting with economists, the Soviet leader prioritized the tasks that faced planning: "... The first task is to plan in such a way as to ensure the independence of the socialist economy from

the capitalist environment. This is by far the most important. This is a form of struggle with a world capitalism. To ensure that you have metal and machines in your hands, so as not to become an appendage to the capitalist economy, this is the basis of planning" [10]. Even the need to "...consolidate the undivided dominance of the socialist system of economy and close the sources and valves of capitalism ..." [10] was only in second place! The now famous speech of I.V. Stalin before the voters on February 9, 1946, also confirms the conservatism of the Soviet leadership in this matter: "As for plans for a longer period, the party intends to organize a new powerful upswing in the national economy, which would enable us to raise the level of our industry, for example, three times compared with the pre-war level. We need to ensure that our industry can annually produce up to 50 million tons of pig iron, up to 60 million tons of steel, up to 500 million tons of coal, up to 60 million tons of oil. Only under this condition it can be considered that our Motherland will be guaranteed against all kinds of accidents ..." [11, 28]. The economic independence of the country was built on the self-sufficiency of the national economy. This meant that the USSR should have access to the production of any industrial products manufactured in the world. The mechanism worked out during the forced industrialization was reproduced: the development of the heavy industry again became the beginning of the chain. Ensuring the production of the right amount of metal created an opportunity for the growth of engineering, which, in turn, became the basis for the technical armament of all industries and agriculture. These attitudes formed the basis of the IV and V five-year plans for the development of the national economy.

In the draft theses of the report on the fifth five-year plan (1951–1955) of May 29, 1952, it was vigorously emphasized that the USSR industry was able to achieve the planned first post-war five-year plan ahead of schedule - in 4 years and 3 months. Already in 1950, industrial output was 73% more than in 1940, and the output of heavy industry compared with the last pre-war year increased even more than 2 times [13, 20].

Today, researchers have identified a significant share of reparations and assistance received under Lend-Lease in the restoration of the national economy [12]. Nevertheless, the successes of post-war Soviet modernization are impressive: for 1946 - 1950 it was "... restored, built and put into operation over 6,000 industrial enterprises, not counting small state, cooperative and collective farm enterprises ...". [14, 15]. In addition, the engineering industry was also able to update the range of products. In the IV five-year plan, they mastered about 250 new types of general-purpose metal-cutting machines, more than 1,000 types of special and modular machines, 23 types of automatic and semi-automatic machines, 34 types of forge-and-press automatic machines, new pneumatic molding machines and casting machines [13, 15]. Of course, there was a price paid for this "miracle": when reporting on the growth in the production of consumer goods, the specialists of the State Planning Commission (who were preparing the draft abstracts on the results of the IV Five-Year Plan) preferred to note modestly - "significantly increased" [13, 23]. In reality, it lacked the most necessary. In addition, there was an acute problem of housing, the means to solve which were even planned less than required [15].

Documents paint gloomy pictures of post-war life. As an example of a typical state of affairs, one can cite a quotation from the memorandum of the Commissioner for the Molotovskaya and Voroshilovgradskaya Regions of the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I.T. Savchenko: "... In the 5/5 bis mine administration (head Comrade Chekardin, Party organizer Comrade Ulasyuk) of the Sverdlovsky region, out of 1,191 working people, 300 people live in dormitories. One of them (for 200 people) is located 3 kilometers from the mine in a former ten-year school (two-story building). Due to mismanagement, the heating system is out of order. The rooms are equipped with temporary stoves, the latter smoke very much. Workers sleep on wooden trestle beds, but they are not enough. As a result, three trestle beds accommodate 4-5 people. There are no

cabinets or hangers. Sheets are changed once every two months. There is no light in the dormitory. They don't bring water, and the workers are forced to carry it for three kilometers. They don't bring coal and workers carry it from the mine. Coal is stored in a hostel under trestle beds. Laundry of underwear is not organized, workers wash clothes how who adapt to... "[16].

Poor living conditions led to large staff turnover, a decrease in labor discipline, and a drop in labor productivity. Even therefore, these issues required an immediate solution.

Thus, the Soviet leadership had to find an effective mechanism to effectively use the limited resources at its disposal, given the priority of the modernization breakthrough. An important role in solving this problem was played by self-financing, the bonus system, the director's fund, the introduction of indicators of production costs for certain types of products, etc. But they could be "turned on" only by strengthening the Soviet ruble. Therefore, the preparation of monetary reform began when fighting was still going on on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

The war led to a breakdown in money circulation. There was a "canopy" - the stocks of money at the population not secured by goods. Due to the fact that the reform was confiscatory, it achieved its goal. If on December 1, 1947 the money supply in circulation amounted to 63.4 billion rubles, then at the beginning of 1948 it was 13.4 billion rubles [13]. Soviet economists, who presented an analytical report on the results of the reform, noted that even at the end of 1948 the money supply in the hands of the population was limited to essential goods, and in the balance of cash income and expenses of the townspeople 82% was occupied by wages [17].

In addition to improving the financial system of the state with the help of monetary reform, the government also increased the fiscal burden on the population: increased city transport tariffs and reduced pensions for disabled people of the 3rd group. Agricultural tax also grew. Collective farmers, who needed money to pay for it, were forced to cut prices in the market.

The result was that material interest in the results of labor began to work to increase its productivity. On the verge of IV and V five-year periods, the cost of industrial production sharply decreased, and in the V five-year period (1951 - 1955), more than 2/3 of the increase in industrial production was already achieved due to an increase in labor productivity [18].

The problem of living standards continued to be on the agenda. The Soviet leadership found an original way to solve it, resorting to lower retail prices in state trade. This approach was embodied even when working on a new program of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the summer of 1947. It was precisely the reduction in prices, as a factor in raising the well-being of the people, the importance of which will increase as the output of consumer goods increases, that the Soviet social scientists assigned so much importance that in their plans it became "the road to communism" [20]. If the "road map" of building communism was not implemented, then attributing the phenomenon of post-war annual price reductions to the most important mechanisms of the modernization spurt is quite natural. The fact is that lower retail prices led to lower wholesale and revised production standards. Given that one of the main indicators for assessing the work of the labor collective was the reduction in cost, enterprises were forced to reduce costs in the production process. Thus, price reductions also acted as an alternative to market competition.

The decline in prices in state trade put pressure on the "market sector". And in second place in the "Stalinist" coordinate system, as we recall, was the struggle against the "valves of capitalism".

But its functions were not limited to this either: price reductions carried the burden of a charge of social optimism, reconciling the post-war society with the necessity of life in

difficult conditions. As follows from sources, the Soviet leadership sensitively followed this process.

According to the Central Statistical Office (CSB) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the population's benefit from the first price reduction (1947) per year was 57 billion rubles, from the second (1948-1949) 48 billion rubles, from the third (1950) - 80 billion rubles, from the fourth (1951) - 27.5 billion rubles, from the fifth (1952) - 24 billion rubles, from the sixth (1953) - 46 billion rubles [19].

Sources testify to the "annual holiday", which became an opportunity for Soviet citizens to expand their consumer basket by purchasing previously inaccessible items: "... the following products are in high demand everywhere: woolen fabrics - sold 2 times more than regular sales, cotton fabrics - 59%, stockings and socks - 2.3 times, leather shoes - 2.6 times, laundry soap - 3.5 times. People bought significantly more bicycles, radios, sewing machines, motorcycles, etc. Along with this, the sale of goods that were not in high demand before increased significantly. For example, champagne sold more than 4.3 times, wine and cognac - 6.6 times, garments 58%, toilet soap 7.5 times, pocket watches 4.5 times and gramophones 6 times...." - reported on March 3rd, 1950 the planning and financial department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the progress of trade at reduced prices [21].

The importance of the struggle for economic independence of the USSR was dictated not only by the ideological features of socialist modernization, but also by the factor of the rapidly unfolding Cold War. Despite the fact that the eternal question is "who is to blame?" in such a rapid change in the relationship of recent allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, there is still heated discussion, the Marshall plan as the point of no return, which launched the formation of the bipolar world, is recognized by most modern historians [6].

One of the most important tasks of Soviet foreign policy was the consolidation of the "Soviet bloc". Among the methods for resolving it, one can name the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949. The USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania became members of this organization. In 1950, the GDR joined them. At the first stage of its existence, CMEA dealt with questions of foreign trade between the countries of the socialist camp. After the formation of the Executive Committee and other working bodies of this organization, it was a question of closer economic cooperation. Most modern historians agree with the assessment of CMEA as a bloc opposed to the economic and political union of the countries of Western Europe and the USA [22].

The desire to keep the allies in the zone of its influence imposed additional obligations on the USSR. In 1947 –1949 The USSR had to refuse reparation payments and supplies from Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and since 1951 from the GDR [7]. As of March 1, 1950, the total amount of loans provided by the Soviet Union to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Korea amounted to 1.353.6 million rubles [23].

The United States struck the USSR "Achilles heel" - applied a system of economic sanctions. In March 1948, a licensing procedure was introduced restricting the export of industrial equipment to the USSR and the countries of "people's democracy". For countries included in the assistance program under the Marshall Plan, the United States published in June 1950 lists of goods prohibited for trade with the USSR and its allies. In June 1951, the Law on Trade Agreements was passed. According to Soviet experts, it created adverse conditions for the import of goods from the USSR [24].

The pressure exerted on the USSR confirmed in the eyes of the Soviet leadership the correctness of the priorities set, strengthened the vector of economic independence. At the same time, the Soviet Union needed to "tie" allies with economic "threads" as well. The decision to increase the country's international prestige by establishing the gold content of the ruble logically fits into the strategy of the Stalinist leadership.

The commission, which was carefully miscalculating and justifying this step, was created by a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of March 5th, 1949. It consisted of highly qualified specialists who knew all the nuances of the practice of the "Stalinist model": A. Mikoyan, N. Voznesensky, A. Kosygin, A. Zverev, M. Menshikov, V. Popov, N. Chechulin, I. Zlobin, F. Bystrov. Later, the commission was also strengthened by N. Bulganin, G. Kosyachenko and V. Starovsky.

The commission's conclusions, set out in two reports, were unequivocal: "... taking into account the interests of the USSR as a gold mining and gold exporting country, as well as the interests of the independence of the Soviet ruble, its independence from foreign currencies and in order to turn the ruble into the leading currency of other countries, first of all, countries of people's democracy ... "[25, 23], reinforce the ruble with a gold base.

The reaction of contemporaries is very curious. In The New York Times, there was a concern: "... officials, whose opinions coincide with the first reaction of financial circles, saw in this an attempt by the Soviet government to demonstrate its financial strength by increasing the value of the ruble, while some Western countries seeking to obtain markets for export, had to depreciate their currencies ... "[26, 25]. The official circles of London considered the goal of Moscow the transformation of "... the ruble into a currency that has international circulation (since this destroys all its ties with the dollar) ..." [26, 31]. At a press conference, USA Treasury Secretary John Wesley Snyder declined to comment on the "decoupling" of the ruble from the dollar, saying that he: "cannot predict how the revaluation of the ruble will affect the US dollar" [26].

The next step of Moscow in upholding economic independence was the 1952 International Conference. Until now, the RSASPI has several cases of its materials in secret storage. But documents available to researchers paint a curious picture. Having initiated this event on behalf of the World Peace Council, Soviet leaders very quickly realized that it would not attract business circles in this format. The bet was made precisely on them. Therefore, the meeting was positioned as non-governmental, it was emphasized that questions about the advantages or disadvantages of various social systems would remain outside its scope [27].

In a progress report on the preparation of the conference of January 26, 1952, V.G. Grigoryan (the head of the foreign policy commission of the Central Committee in charge of this "project") formulated very succinctly: "... to help disrupt the plans of the USA government aimed at holding a trade blockade and various kinds of economic discrimination against the USSR, the countries of people's democracy and China" [24].

Western experts evaluated the Conference as a "long-range policy" aimed, in the long run, at successfully solving the geopolitical tasks of the USSR [28]. The success of the Kremlin's new strategy was recognized as highly probable due to correctly chosen allies: the prospect of entering the unfilled goods market "from the Oder to the Pacific Ocean" could not fail to attract business.

The fact that Moscow relied heavily on business circles is confirmed by materials from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which contain a thorough analysis of international trade and the possibilities of its expansion [24]. They formed the basis of the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "On the Basic Provisions of the Speech of the Soviet Representative at the International Economic Conference", which contained interesting concrete proposals for increasing the turnover of trade for each delegation that arrived [24].

The calculations of the Soviet leadership turned out to be correct - delegations arrived in Moscow even from the countries whose governments put pressure on businessmen. 339 participants from 38 capitalist countries, a VPF delegation, 132 participants from the

countries of "people's democracy", China, East Germany, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam and the MPR met on April 10, 1952 in the Column Hall of the House of Unions.

On April 25, 1952 P.N. Kумыкин reported to I.V. Stalin about the success of the Conference: Soviet purchases amounted to 176 million rubles, sales of 90 million rubles. The allies of the Soviet Union actively participated in trade. A committee was set up to promote international trade, which was to prepare a new meeting. The press of the capitalist countries noted that "...the movement for the abolition of restrictive measures in foreign trade and for the strengthening and expansion of international economic relations ... has intensified significantly" [29].

Unexpectedly quickly, Moscow lost interest in promoting this political line. This is one of the many "blank spots" of late Stalinism. Researchers hypothesize the reasons for this ending. It can be assumed that the background of the Conference was to put pressure on the USA government through business, lifting the ban on trade in so-called "dual-use goods". Spending money on the massive purchase of consumer goods, the Soviet leaders considered as unacceptable luxury. In other words, the USSR did not have enough resources for the further development of success.

4 Discussion

Thus, the presented results of the study of the documents reveal as key factors in the choice by the Soviet leaders of the priority development of sector "A" (production of means of production), characterize the tactics on which the implementation of this strategy was based. The presented approach makes it possible to supplement the picture that has developed in modern historiography.

At the same time, an analysis of the documents indicates the importance of the factor of the struggle for the country's economic independence, reveals its role in solving managerial issues relating to both foreign and domestic policies. The authors of the paper relied on the hypothesis put forward by Doctor of Economics V.Yu. Katasonov. In turn, this hypothesis was compared by them with the study of Doctor of History M.A. Lipkin, based on a wide source base. This approach, supported by the analysis of documents stored in the funds of the Central Committee of the CPSU (F.17), V.M. Molotov (F.82), A. Mikoyan (F. 84) RGASPI, made it possible for the authors to argue that the conclusions of the researchers are completely consistent. Of course, the source base clearly reveals the emerging foreign policy line, which was later called - "peaceful coexistence".

At the same time, the strengthening of the ruble, its transfer to the "gold base", the conduct of the IES - in all of this, the continuity of actions can be traced, confirming the V.Yu. Katasonov's hypothesis - it is perfectly acceptable that the further development of the chosen strategy was supposed, which was no longer implemented by the I.V. Stalin "heirs".

Nevertheless, a promising line of the research, which seems to be the authors of the paper, requires the continuation and deepening of the analysis of the source base. This will make it possible to further develop the hypothesis that the Soviet leadership plans to create an alternative to the dollar - "ruble" - market, and will also contribute to a better understanding of the intricacies of factors that influenced the development of the USSR during the period of "late Stalinism".

5 Conclusions

As conclusions, it can be noted that the authors, based on a study of a wide source base, identified and substantiated the contribution of the factor of the struggle for the country's

economic independence in the formation of the post-war development strategy of the USSR. The Soviet leadership put the economic independence of the country among the priorities that shaped management decisions. This approach was dictated both by the peculiarities of ideology and the desire to uphold geopolitical interests (as they were interpreted by party leaders). Under the conditions of a strictly limited amount of resources, the USSR was able to restore the country's national economy as soon as possible, create a "nuclear shield", actively participate in the formation of a bipolar world, keeping its allies in the zone of influence. The mechanisms that were used to implement such difficult tasks are of interest to this day. But it is necessary to study them, based on the principles of historicism and objectivity, without moving to a "revealing tone" and not forgetting the rigidity, sometimes turning into cruelty, characteristic of managerial decisions of that time. The introduction of new "touches" supplementing the existing historiography of the problem helps researchers to remove the "white spots" of the late Stalinism period. In addition, consideration of the post-war policy of the Soviet leadership from this angle brings to the issue of the effectiveness / inefficiency of Soviet modernization, allowing it to outline its "Procrustean" bed.

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