Japan’s Energy Policy towards the SCO Member States: Current Situation and the Perspectives

¹ Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Japanese Studies, 117997, Nakhimovsky Av. 32, Moscow, Russia
² Russian State University for the Humanities, Faculty of International Relation and Foreign Area Studies, 125993, Miusskaya Sq. 6, Moscow, Russia

^* Corresponding author: korinf2@yandex.ru

Abstract

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is undoubtedly an important economic and geopolitical player in the Central, East and South Asia regions, bringing together countries of different size and potential. This is primarily about the economy and energy sectors, but the military-strategic partnership within the framework of the association shouldn’t be ignored too. Japan does not have a coherent policy towards the SCO as a single structure, at least it is not reflected in official documents, but individual member States are of significant interest. These are mainly Russia and China, and Russia is considered as one of the chief energy resources suppliers, which contributes to the implementation of the Japanese concept of energy security, aimed at maximum diversification of supply geography. China is regarded as one of the largest buyers of Japanese high-tech industrial products and an exporter of coal. The countries of the Central Asian region, which are rich in energy resources and do not have sufficient financial and technological capabilities to explore them, are also attracting more and more attention from Japan, but there is great competition with Chinese companies. India and Pakistan, that joined the SCO in 2017, are important for Japan as a counterweight to China’s expansion in South Asia and also markets for Japanese nuclear power plant construction technologies and various types of renewable energy generators. All in all, Japanese energy policy towards the SCO member States is balanced and flexible, but the presence of certain geopolitical contradictions with the founders of the organization still hinders the building of a meaningful multilateral dialogue, although options for involving Japan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization periodic work, for instance, in the observer status, have been repeatedly voiced.