The Evolutionary Game Model of Local Government Environmental Regulation with Media Participation

¹ School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China
² School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China

^* Corresponding author’s e-mail: mayueyue@dufe.edu.cn

Abstract

The battle for pollution prevention and control has been promoted in an all-round way, and the quality of the ecological environment has been significantly improved, but the results are not stable, and environmental problems are still prominent. With the development of social economy, media supervision is playing an increasingly important role in government actions and environmental issues. This paper considers the role of media supervision, constructs an evolutionary game model between local governments and enterprises, analyzes and explains the evolutionary equilibrium. The results show that the media exposure of corporate pollution and local government inaction is conducive to achieve evolutionary equilibrium {regulation, cleaner production}. Local governments give enterprises pollution control subsidies and environmental protection rewards, which can promote green and clean production of enterprises. The paper provides a useful reference for promoting clean production of enterprises and achieving high-quality development.