Issue |
E3S Web Conf.
Volume 162, 2020
The 4th International Conference on Power, Energy and Mechanical Engineering (ICPEME 2020)
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|
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Article Number | 01006 | |
Number of page(s) | 5 | |
Section | Power and Energy Engineering | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202016201006 | |
Published online | 07 April 2020 |
A Two-Sided Price-Decoupled Pay-As-Bid Auction Approach for the Clearing of Day-Ahead Electricity Markets
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Information Technology and Bionics, 1083 Práter u. 50/A, Budapest, Hungary
* Corresponding author: csercsik@itk.ppke.hu
In this paper we propose a possible alternative for conventional pay-as-clear type multiunit auctions commonly used for the clearing of day-ahead power exchanges, and analyse some of its characteristic features in comparison with conventional clearing. In the proposed framework, instead of the concept of the uniform market clearing price, we introduce limit prices separately for supply and demand bids, and in addition to the power balance constraint, we formulate constraints for the income balance of the market. The total traded quantity is used as the objective function of the formulation. The concept is demonstrated on a simple example and is compared to the conventional approach in small-scale market simulations.
© The Authors, published by EDP Sciences, 2020
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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