A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Carbon Reduction Decisions in Shipping Industry

College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, PR China

^* Corresponding author: zhangsuyong@shmtu.edu.cn

Abstract

Considering the carbon trading mechanism and the preference of cargo side for low carbon shipping, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of three parties, namely, government, shipping enterprises and cargo side, and analyzes the evolutionary process of the choice of carbon emission reduction strategies of the three parties. Numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis are conducted based on the practical experience of Shanghai carbon trading pilot. The results show that, (1) Under the current conditions, the three-party strategy will eventually evolve into {the government actively supervises, shipping enterprises negatively reduce emission, and the cargo side actively responds}. (2) The stronger government intervention, the increase of carbon price can guide shipping enterprises to actively reduce emissions. (3) The idea of decarbonization driven by the demand side should be paid attention to, which can help bring together all parties to reduce emissions.